An identity-based key infrastructure suitable for messaging applications by Karatop, Ayşe Gül et al.
0048 1
An Identity-Based Key Infrastructure Suitable for
Messaging Applications
Ays¸e Gu¨l Karatop and Erkay Savas¸
Sabanci University
Tuzla, Istanbul, Turkey
aysegulk@su.sabanciuniv.edu, erkays@sabanciuniv.edu
Abstract—Identity-based encryption (IBE) systems are rel-
atively recently proposed; yet they are highly popular for
messaging applications since they offer new features such as
certificateless infrastructure and anonymous communication. In
this paper, we intended to propose an IBE infrastructure for
messaging applications. The proposed infrastructure requires one
registration authority and at least one public key generator and
they secret share the master secret key. In addition, the PKG also
shares the same master secret with each user in the system in a
different way. Therefore, the PKG will never be able to learn the
private keys of users under non-collusion assumption. We discuss
different aspects of the proposed infrastructure such as security,
key revocation, uniqueness of the identities that constitute the
main drawbacks of other IBE schemes. We demonstrate that
our infrastructure solves many of these drawbacks under certain
assumptions.
Index Terms—Identity Based Encryption, Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography
I. INTRODUCTION
Identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme is a public key
cryptosystem where the public keys are unique identities in
arbitrary string forms. For instance, e-mail addresses, names,
pseudonyms or IP addresses can serve as a public key in
IBE systems. The original concept was initially introduced
by Shamir in 1984 [14] while the first practical realization
of IBE system is based on pairing-based cryptography by
Boneh and Franklin [1]. With the advent of pairing-based
cryptography; new applications of IBE cryptosystem as well
as new techniques, to realize it more efficiently, become the
major focus of the contemporary research. Generally speaking,
in IBE cryptosystems, there exists a trusted third party, so-
called Private Key Generator(PKG), which is responsible for
generating global parameters to be employed in the system
as well as the private keys for the registered users. Users
obtain their private keys from the PKG, in order to decrypt
their messages intended for them. The secure delivery of
private keys should be performed over secure channels, where
confidentiality and authentication are provided.
IBE is principally a public key cryptosystem, where each
user has a public and private key pair. To illustrate, suppose
that a user, Alice, wants to send a message to Bob. She
encrypts the message with Bob’s unique public key, e.g.
his e-mail address ‘bob@sabanciuniv.edu’. Bob requests the
corresponding private key from the PKG, to decrypt the
message. The PKG calculates the private key, sends to Bob,
and Bob consequently decrypts the message.
Since the bound between the user and the user’s public
key is based on an inherent or real-word relationship (e.g.
user/name, user/e-mail address, user/assumed role etc.), the
need for an infrastructure is seen by some not as compre-
hensive as the conventional public key infrastructure(PKI).
Whereas as elaborately pointed out in [4], a fully-functional
IBE system would also require a complex infrastructure in
which some aspects have not been fully investigated. Firstly,
there is the issue of uniqueness of public keys in IBE since
real world names or identities tend to be not unique. Therefore,
there should be a registration authority to keep track of used
names, i.e. public keys. Secondly, the key revocation could
lead to some inconvenience since one may find difficult to
obtain a new descriptive name for oneself such as finding a
new name. One way to revoke a key without actually changing
the public key requires that system parameters be changed
resulting in changing of private key of every user in the system.
And finally, all IBE schemes have the key escrowing property,
which is considered as a weakness since the PKG knows the
private key of every user. Thus, the PKG can not only decrypt
any message but also can fabricate a signature on behalf of
any user.
In this paper, our contribution is proposing solutions to some
of the shortcomings of IBE systems. Our basic construction
follows the idea of secret sharing of the master secret key
between two semi-honest parties, namely the private key gen-
erator (PKG) and the registration authority (RA). In addition,
the PKG shares the same master secret key with each user in
a different way, having one share for each user registered in
the system. Thus, a user and the PKG have to participate in a
protocol to generate the private key for the user. A user’s only
interaction with the RA is during the registration phase, in
which the RA not only checks the uniqueness of the identity
but also assists in the protocol that generates two new shares of
the master secret key for the user and the PKG. One benefit of
our model is that there is no need to employ a secure channel
between the PKG and users to deliver private keys since the
PKG can send only its share of the private key to users.
We also propose to use ever-changing public keys by
attaching date information to the natural identities of users
from the perspective of communication models.
We give a brief information about identity-based encryption
systems and their mathematical background in the second
section. The third part includes a detailed explanation of our
infrastructure. The analysis of our proposed scheme is given
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in section four. An additional property, namely the anonymity
of our system is discussed in section five. In the sixth section,
implementation details are given. The paper ends up with
conclusion and future works.
II. IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION SYSTEMS
In this section, we will give background information of an
identity-based encryption scheme.
A. Mathematical Background
We use identity-based encryption (IBE) systems that utilize
elliptic curves and pairing operations as proposed in [1]. An
elliptic curve E(Fp) over a finite field Fp is defined with the
equation,
y2 = x3 + ax+ b with a, b ∈ Fp
The solutions to this equation are called elliptic curve points,
and shown as P = (x, y), where x and y are the coordinates
and elements of the underlying field Fp. The points on elliptic
curve along with so-called point at infinity form an additive
group. We can denote the point addition as P +Q, and define
elliptic curve scalar multiplication of an elliptic curve point P
by an integer α, as αP . The order of a point is the smallest
integer, n, such that nP = O , where O denotes the point
at infinity, which is the identity element of the elliptic curve
group. The security of elliptic curves depends on the difficulty
of solving elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
The ECDLP basically states that given two points Q and P
from the equation, Q = αP , it is computationally difficult to
find α.
Bilinear maps over elliptic curve points play a central role in
IBE systems. A bilinear map is defined over two groups of the
same prime-order q denoted by G1 and G2. G1 is an additive
group and is formed of a group of points on elliptic curves
while G2 is a multiplicative group. Bilinear map, therefore, is
defined as G1 × G1 → G2. Basically, a bilinear map, which
is denoted as eˆ(·, ·), accepts two elements as input from G1
and returns an element in G2. The major property of bilinear
maps is bilinearity [5] which is explained below.
eˆ(xP, yQ) = eˆ(P, yQ)x = eˆ(P, xyQ) = eˆ(P,Q)xy
∀P,Q ∈ G1,∀x, y ∈ Zq
Tate and Weil pairings [10], [6] are the most used pairing
functions. Our scheme is based on Tate pairing which is, in
general, more efficiently calculated than the Weil pairing.
Public and private keys of users, in IBE systems, are elliptic
curve points. For this purpose, a hash function, H1 which is
defined as H1 : {0.1}∗ → G1, is employed to convert a string
of arbitrary length (i.e. identity) to a point on the underlying
elliptic curve. In addition to H1, another hash function, H2 :
G2 → {0, 1}
n is used in encryption and decryption phases.
For further information about elliptic curves and pairing based
cryptography one can profitably refer to [8] and [3].
B. Work Flow of IBE
In general, an IBE System consists of four phases [12]:
1) Setup phase: consists of two steps:
• Selection of the elliptic curve and the master key, s,
and the generation of the public key of the system,
PSY S = sP , where P is the generator point of G1,
group of chosen elliptic curve.
• Selection of hash functions, H1, H2 and the bilinear
mapping function.
2) Extraction: The private key generator generates the
users’ private. The public key of a user (ID) is denoted
as QID while the private key of a user is denoted as
DID.
QID = H1(ID) and DID = sQID
where ID is an arbitrary string information
3) Encryption: Encryption is performed by using the re-
ceiver’s public key (say Alice) as follows:
• (U, V ) = (rP,M ⊕H2(gQ))
• where r ∈R Z∗q (i.e. r is randomly selected in Zq)
• and gQ = eˆ(QA, PSY S)r and ⊕ denotes exclusive-
OR operation.
Here M is the plaintext and the pair (U, V ) is the
ciphertext, which is consequently sent to Alice.
4) Decryption: In decryption phase, the ciphertext (U, V )
can only be decrypted if the receiver’s private key (DA)
is known. The following steps are applied in decryption
process:
V ⊕H2(gQ′) =M where gQ′ = eˆ(DA, U)
III. OUR INFRASTRUCTURE
This section describes the main steps in the proposed
infrastructure omitting the encryption and decryption phases
since they are identical to the original IBE encryption and
decryption schemes outlined above.
A. Setup Phase
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Fig. 1. The two-party protocol for computing PSY S
In our infrastructure, we utilize secret sharing of the master
key, s. With this purpose, two semi-honest parties are formed,
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the Private Key Generator(PKG) and the Registration Author-
ity(RA). The RA is responsible for registering users in the
beginning while the PKG is responsible for key distribution.
In addition, the RA and PKG share the master secret key as
follows: Initially, the RA and the PKG choose two random
secret keys, sRA and sPKG, where s = sRA + sPKG is the
master key. Since s must not be known by two semi-honest
parties, we stipulate that the RA and the PKG do not collude
with each other. A two-party protocol for generating the secret
share and the public key of the system PSY S is illustrated in
Figure 1.
After selecting its secret share of master secret key, the RA
computes PRA = sRAP , which is its share of public key
of the system, and sends it to the PKG. Similarly, the PKG
computes its share of system public key, PPKG = sPKGP
and performs the elliptic curve addition PSY S = PPKG +
PRA. Consequently, the PKG publishes the system public key,
PSY S .
B. Registration phase
In the registration phase, the user is first introduced to the
system by a secure three-party protocol that involves the user,
the RA, and the PKG. The aim of the three-party protocol is
two-fold: i) check the uniqueness of the user identity, and ii)
securely compute new shares of the master secret and give one
share to the user and the other to the PKG. The protocol steps
are illustrated in Figure 2. The registration phase utilizes public
key cryptography and we assume that the user (i.e. Alice in
Figure 2) knows the public keys of the RA and PKG. ERA[x]
and EPKG[x] stands for the encryption of x with public key
of the corresponding party, i.e. the public keys of RA and
PKG, respectively. The PKG uses a homomorphic public key
cryptosystem similar to the one in [13]. Therefore, we have
EPKG[m1] · EPKG[m2] = EPKG[m1 +m2].
The protocol steps are explained as follows:
• Step 1 The user (Alice in Figure 2), for the first and last
time, contacts the RA by sending her identity (A) in the
first message. Alice also encrypts the difference between
her secret share sA and random number r1 using the
public key of the RA and sends the resulting ciphertext
X = ERA[r1− sA] along with her identity A to the RA.
• Step 2 The RA first checks whether the ID of Alice, A is
unique; if not, it helps Alice choose a unique identity. It
then obtains the difference r1− sA by decrypting X and
adds its own share of master secret, sRA to the difference.
It, subsequently, encrypts r1 − sA + sRA and sends the
resulting ciphertext Y = EPKG[r1 − sA + sRA] back to
Alice.
• Step 3 Alice removes the random number r1 by perform-
ing the operation EPKG[r1− sA+ sRA] ·EPKG[−r1] =
EPKG[sRA−sA]. The resulting ciphertext EPKG[sRA−
sA] is sent to the PKG. Alice also sends EPKG[sAP ] to
the PKG, which serves as her public key to authenticate
Alice to the PKG in their subsequent transactions.
• Step 4 The PKG first performs the following operation
EPKG[sRA − sA] · EPKG[sPKG] = EPKG[s − sA]. It
then decrypts the resulting ciphertext and obtain its share
of master secret sA′. Note that s = sA + sA′. The PKG
also decrypts EPKG[sAP ] and obtains Alice’s public key
sAP that is used only in authentication protocol described
in subsequent sections.
As a result of registration phase, the user and the PKG come
to have different shares of the master secret s. Therefore, a
user and the PKG must collaborate to generate a private key
corresponding to any public key chosen by the user. Provided
that none of the users and the PKG do not collude, the master
secret will never be revealed. Note that no coalition of users
is able to construct the master secret since the user shares
themselves do not contain any information about the master
secret.
We have two motivations to believe that non-collusion
assumption is valid and realistic: i) the PKG is semi-honest,
and therefore does not try to learn about the secret shares of
the users unless openly told by the users, and ii) a user does
not want to reveal its share to the PKG since doing so gives the
PKG the ability to access the messages intended for the user
and to generate signatures on behalf of the user. Furthermore,
the secret share sA of a user can always be kept in a trusted
zone of its hardware and will never leave this zone in the clear.
For instance, the first step of the registration phase calculates
the difference of this secret share and a random number,
r1 − sA. The difference will be known; but neither r1 nor sA
can be deduced from the difference. Consequently, the user
itself would never learn what sA is in the first place to reveal
it to PKG. The user secret share is just a randomly selected
number and can be changed easily. In case of compromise, the
revocation only requires that the user secret share is changed
and the registration phase is repeated.
C. Public Key Selection and Private Key Extraction
In identity-based encryption system, public keys are gen-
erally arbitrary strings that contain identity of the user and
other relevant publicly available information. Furthermore,
the public keys can contain descriptive information about the
intended recipient. This clearly alleviates the problem of public
key certification used to establish a binding between the public
key and the identity of public key owner. Apparently, this bond
is inherent in IBE systems. This, nevertheless, complicates the
key revocation problem since changing a user’s public key
entails changing of its identity. Changing one’s identity raises
certain concerns since finding another descriptive name for
an individual may be difficult on it own right. However, the
more important point is the complicated infrastructure (e.g.
certification revocation lists) required for informing other users
on the compromised or stale public keys.
In messaging applications, on the other hand, the problem of
key revocation can be addressed using ”ever-changing” public
keys. Namely, public key of a user can contain strings related
to situational information such as the location, time, date, and
role of the user besides the unique identity of the user. We
simply propose to include date (or time) information in the
identity (hence the public key) of the user. Therefore, the
users in our messaging infrastructure has public keys, that
are updated frequently. For instance, an ID may contain date
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Fig. 2. The registration phase
information, such as August 02, 2007, which is is public
information and can be appended to the ID easily. The string
”erkays@sabanciuniv.edu:08/07/2007” is an example for ever-
changing public keys.
If the public keys change as frequently as every day,
then the corresponding private keys must be re-computed as
frequently. As mentioned earlier, both the user and the PKG
must participate in the private key generation procedure. In
classical IBE systems, the secret key is generated by the PKG
and then securely transmitted to the user. Before, the key
generation, the user must authenticate itself to the PKG and
secure channel must be established between the user and the
PKG. Otherwise, the private key can be fallen in the hands of
other users or worse yet adversaries. The proposed scheme,
on the other hand, utilizes only implicit authentication of the
user and does not require a secure channel. The private key
generation scheme is illustrated in Figure 3.
The user, Alice, selects a public key by appending date
and other relevant information to her identity and obtains QA,
which is sent to the PKG. The PKG then computes its share
of the public key sA′ · QA and sends it to Alice. Alice then
computes DA = sA · QA + sA′ · QA = s · QA, which is her
private key, DA corresponding to the public key QA.
D. Identification
In case there is a need for explicit identification of the user
to the PKG, they can use a modified version of Schnorr’s
identification protocol as illustrated in Figure 4. The effort
undertaken by the user is one elliptic curve point multiplication
with a scalar and one multiplication and one subtraction in
modulo n, where n is the order of base point P .
The steps of the identification protocol are summarized
below:
• Step 1 The user Alice, first selects a random integer k
and performs the elliptic curve scalar multiplication, kP ,
Alice PKG
1) Q
A
2) s
A’
Q
A
D
A
 = s
A
Q
A
+s
A’
Q
A
Fig. 3. Private key extraction scheme
Alice PKG
2) r (challenge)
1) kP (witness)
random k
yP-rs
A
P = kP
3) y (response)
?
y = k - s
A
r
random r
Fig. 4. User Identification to the PKG
where P is the base point for the underlying elliptic curve
group. Alice sends kP to the PKG as a witness.
• Step 2 The PKG selects a random integer r and sends it
to Alice as a challenge.
• Step 3 Alice, upon reception of r, computes y ≡ k−sAr
(mod n) and send the resulting value y to the PKG.
• Step 4 The PKG computes yP−rsAP , where sAP serves
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as the public key of Alice obtained during the registration,
and authenticate Alice if the result is the same as the
witness kP .
If PKG needs to authenticate itself to Alice, they can use
any identification scheme utilizing the public key of the PKG
which is assumed to be in possession of Alice.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED INFRASTRUCTURE
In this section, we analyze the proposed infrastructure
from four different perspectives, namely i) security, ii) non-
repudiation, iii) validity of public keys, and iv) key revocation.
A. Security
The security of the proposed infrastructure is based on two
basic assumptions on the involved parties: i) non-collusion
property between certain parties, and ii) semi-honest nature of
the PKG and the RA.
Employing two or more trusted parties that do not collude
was already proposed by Boneh and Franklin in [1] and also in
[2]. In both schemes, a user has to contact all trusted parties to
obtain its private key and furthermore the user has to establish
a secure channel with each trusted party in this key extraction
phase. Our scheme diverges from the previous schemes in
two aspects. Firstly, it introduces two trusted-third parties, the
private key generator (PKG) and registration authority (RA),
which secret share the master secret s and again do not collude
with each other. Secondly, each user shares the same master
secret with the PKG in a different way. Therefore, a user
does not need to contact both trusted parties to acquire his/her
private key since s/he can do so using a protocol involving
itself and the PKG. Furthermore, the communication between
the user and the PKG does not need to be encrypted.
Our second assumption involves the semi-honest nature of
the PKG and the RA. Property of semi-honest party was first
introduced by Goldreich in [7] and it simply assumes that such
parties are honest but curious. In other words, they do not
participate in extra protocol activities but gather any leaked
information from the protocol. For instance, the PKG will
never try to register as a user in the system since this would
compromise the master secret to the PKG. The interface for
user registration is not available to the PKG. Unless the users
openly encrypt their private shares of the master secret with
the public key of the PKG and send it to the PKG the semi-
honest PKG will never learn the private shares of the users.
A user will not reveal his/her private share to the PKG or
RA since this share also serves as his/her private key in the
identification protocol illustrated in Figure 4. In other words,
a user should not collude with the PKG since doing so will
enable the PKG to calculate the master secret s.
Another advantage of the proposed infrastructure is that it
provides convenience in key distribution. Only assumption we
hold in key distribution is that a user who would like to register
knows the public keys of the PKG and RA. Users can acquire
this knowledge from publicly available resources such as web
pages. Furthermore, a user does not necessarily authenticate
oneself to the PKG to obtain the private key since the value
sent by the PKG, i.e. sA′QA, does not contain any information
on the private key of the user. The information sent by the PKG
becomes useful only if it is received by the intended user.
Considering the difficulty of initial identification of users
during the registration as pointed out in [4], we assume that
the user is able to prove her identity to the RA during the
registration protocol. It could be the case where the user
personally goes to the RA and show a piece of identification
to prove her identity. Any further elaboration on this issue is
beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation, by which a user cannot deny her own
transactions with the entities in the system, is a property al-
most non-existent in IBE systems. Our infrastructure provides
the non-repudiation property under non-collusion assumption.
Since a user’s share of the master secret serves also her private
key in her interaction with the PKG, such as identification
protocol, she can be held responsible for protecting her share
from compromise as in the case of private key in conventional
public key cryptosystems. Therefore, IBE signature scheme
provides the non-repudiation.
C. Validity Period of Public Keys
Another issue in the proposed infrastructure is the validity
duration of users’ public keys. As mentioned earlier, we
propose to append date information to IDs of the users. The
issue then becomes what sort of date information to use in the
IDs. Our approach is to define the duration, depending on the
application and the underlying communication model used in
the message exchange. For instance, we propose to append day
information to the IDs in instant messaging applications where
users must be on-line and the communication is transient. The
user acquires the PKG’s part of her private key in the first login
in that day and it computes her private key, which expires next
day.
For asynchronous messaging systems such as e-mail, where
users are most of the time off-line, we propose to use either
date of current week or month information appended to users
ID. We believe that to change the public key of the user
every week does not constitute too much overhead in e-mail
applications. Considering many e-mail messages an average
user receives in a week, storing PKG’s share of user’s private
key (a point on the underlying elliptic curve) in the same
directory as the e-mails received in that week only marginally
increases the storage requirements allocated for that user. Once
the user connects to the exchange server for the first time
in a week it downloads PKG’s share of her private key for
that week. If the user has not connected to the mail server
for more than a week, the user downloads PKG’s share of
belonging private key for previous weeks as well. Note that
these downloading operations are done transparently to the
user or rather it is pushed to the user by the mail server.
By adding the user’s own share to the PKG’s share, the user
obtains the private key for the current week and will be able
to decrypt any message received that week. Note that when
the need arises, for instance by an explicit request from the
user, PKG can re-generate its share of any user’s private key.
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Our infrastructure can easily accommodate role-based mes-
saging applications as proposed in [11]. Instead of using
names, e-mail addresses, pseudonyms, any description for a
role or time and space constraints can be used as a public key
in our infrastructure.
D. Key Revocation Problem
In the proposed IBE scheme, revocation becomes an issue
in two different circumstances: i) a particular time-dependent
private key, e.g. sQA, or ii) secret share of any particular
user, e.g. sA, is compromised. When the former happens,
the adversary can decrypt the messages intended for the
corresponding user or sign messages on behalf of that user
until the expiration date of the corresponding public key.
This is the reason why we would like to use frequently
changing public keys. The shorter the validity period of a
public key, the less likely the corresponding private key being
fallen in the hands of an adversary assuming that capturing a
private key requires substantial efforts. In order to guarantee
that no compromised key is used in encryption or signature
verification operations, the PKG can publish a (revocation)
list of compromised keys. Compromised public keys can be
extended with a known public information to generate a new
public/private key pair.
If a user compromise her share of the master secret, which
we believe is less likely than the former case, the situation
must be handled in a different way. The adversary that has the
secret share can impersonate the corresponding user, decrypt
any messages intended for the user and sign messages on
behalf the user. In addition, the adversary can generate a
new private key in collaboration with the PKG. Therefore,
shortening the validity period does not remedy this situation.
In this case, the user must change its share and initiate a new
registration phase. With the new share of the master secret,
the user implicitly invalidate the old one, with which the
adversary cannot extract the private keys. There is no need
to keep revocation lists since the user does not have to change
its public key after the new share is generated. Adversary
revealing the compromised share to the PKG will, however,
result in loss of non-repudiation property.
V. USING PSEUDONYMS FOR ANONYMITY
The users, for anonymity reasons, may want to use nick-
names or so-called pseudonyms in their interaction with other
users in the system. In the classical setting of IBE systems,
the PKG knows both the public key (identity) and private key
of every user; hence the anonymity cannot be achieved.
Our approach is based on a technique we call blinding of
the pseudonyms. As illustrated in Figure 5, after selecting a
pseudonym, QPN , Alice blinds it by performing elliptic curve
scalar multiplication, kQPN , where k is the randomly selected
blinding factor. The resulting blinded point QBL is then sent
to the PKG that computes sA′QBL and sends it back to Alice.
Alice, finally, computes k−1(sA′QBL) + sAQPN = sQPN .
Consequently, Alice declares QPN (or more specifically PN )
as her public key and uses DPN = sQPN as her private key.
Alice PKG
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2) s
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Q
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(s
A'
Q
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PN: pseudonym
Q
BL
 = kQ
PN
Fig. 5. Pseudonym generation
Another issue with the anonymity is the uniqueness of
chosen pseudonyms. As pointed out in [4], having two users
sharing the same pseudonym will result in the loss of security
and privacy. Thus, users should check whether it is available
before they adopt a pseudonym. One solution to this problem
is that the RA publishes an authentic list of used pseudonyms.
The users check the pseudonym against this list and notify
the RA that the chosen pseudonym is no longer available if
it is not in the list. The RA, in turn, updates the list of used
pseudonyms.
VI. SOME IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Our infrastructure is built upon a supersingular elliptic curve
with the equation y2 = x3 + 1 mod p where p has a
size of 512 bits so as to provide an equivalent security to
1024-bit RSA. For the implementation, we utilize the elliptic
curve and pairing classes of MIRACL library [9] which has
been developed by Shamus Software Limited. In addition,
Intel Celeron 1.5 Ghz computer is used as a base platform
together with its Windows XP operating system. Table 11
features the execution times for the cryptographic operations
in different protocols for each party, namely PKG, RA and
the user. The numbers indicated below each party, show the
execution times of the corresponding process, relevantly in
terms of milliseconds. Clearly, our infrastructure not only
offers a secure infrastructure but also provides an efficient
system with high execution performance.
TABLE I
THE PERFORMANCE
Process PKG(ms) RA(ms) User(ms)
Computing PSY S 16 17 -
Registration 242 143 140
Private Key Extraction 16 - 20
Pseudonym Generation 16 - 60
IBE systems, as pointed out earlier, are convenient for
messaging applications. Therefore, we aim to integrate this
proposed infrastructure with an electronic mail application,
1Note that the communication latencies are excluded. Table 1 is constructed
by running user side only one time, considering the latency requirement on
user side; and both PKG and RA 100 times, since throughput is a concern.
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such as Firefox Thunderbird. The architecture is built on four
entities; the mail server, PKG, RA and the user. Mail server
plays the central role and generally is responsible for the
transfer and retrieval of mails for the user. For registration
and setup phases, user interacts both with PKG and RA.
In addition, mail server works as a bridge between RA and
PKG, especially for the phase where both parties participate
in generation of the system public key.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we proposed a new IBE infrastructure that
is intended for utilization in messaging applications. The
proposed infrastructure aims to solve some inherent drawbacks
of the IBE systems while retaining their advantage. Key
escrowing problem is solved by a method where users and
the private key generator secret shares the master secret key.
The omniscient private key generator in classical IBE systems
which knows all private keys is replaced by a semi-honest
third party that does not have information about these private
keys. In the presence of the semi-honest private key generator,
it is possible to have anonymous communication and non-
repudiation property under the non-collusion assumption. We
implemented the cryptographic protocols used in the proposed
infrastructure and demonstrated that computational require-
ments for the parties are acceptable. We are, currently, in
the process of integrating an e-mail system with the proposed
infrastructure. As a future work, we aim to explore the hierar-
chical pseudonym management protocol within the proposed
infrastructure.
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